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Testimony of the Governor of the Banco de España, Miguel Fernández Ordóñez, to the 
Parliamentary Committee on Financial Affairs
Ladies and gentlemen,
My appearance before this Committee comes at a juncture characterised by two notable phe-
nomena. First, the continued strong momentum of the global, European and Spanish econo-
mies for yet another year. And second, the sudden emergence of uncertainty in the world 
economy as a consequence of turbulence on the fi nancial markets.
The root cause of this turbulence is the increase in US sub-prime mortgage loan defaults. The 
distinctive feature of these loans is that they have been granted to individuals with incomplete, 
or even inexistent, credit records illustrative in all cases of a high risk profi le. These loans have, 
moreover, often been extended under rather lax conditions and hence have ultimately put the 
US institutions involved in a highly vulnerable position.
When the (in all likelihood excessive) risk exposures materialised, the intermediaries specialis-
ing in mortgages of this type began to incur losses and some of them were unable to meet 
their payment commitments. In the early stages, then, the crisis was confi ned to a limited 
number of specialised US fi nancial intermediaries.
However, the weight of the US economy in world events, the high volume of funds attracted 
by it in recent years on the international markets and, above all, the strong interdependence 
that has developed between these markets and between fi nancial institutions worldwide as a 
result of globalisation, have ultimately resulted in the fi nancial turbulence taking on a global 
dimension.
A key factor in propagating the turbulence internationally has been the prolifi c development in 
recent years of new structured fi nancial instruments designed to smooth the transfer of credit 
risk between different agents. These new assets enable greater diversifi cation of banks’ loan 
portfolios and therefore more effi cient management of underlying risks. On the downside, 
however, there are also potential adverse effects owing to the valuation diffi culties derived from 
their complexity and to the weak incentives for institutions specialising in these practices to 
properly calibrate risks that they may not ultimately assume. I shall return to this point later 
on.
The spread of the turbulence throughout the international system brought falling valuations 
and rising volatilities in a good number of stock markets, along with a general increase in the 
credit risk premiums demanded in fi xed-income markets. These movements refl ect a trend 
towards the more accurate pricing of risks following a long period of excessive indulgence, 
and this should make for sounder economies in the medium and long term. Nevertheless, the 
correction is causing tension in lending conditions which, if it persists too long, could also bear 
on the confi dence of investors and other economic agents.
However, it is still premature to assess the effect of these shocks on world economic growth. 
Signifi cant data are not yet available on how economies have performed after the shock. In any 
event, the size of the possible effect will depend closely on how much the US economy is af-
fected by the turbulence that has arisen there. The information available so far shows that the 
United States is more resilient to the residential investment crisis than originally envisaged, so 
the foreseeable effects seem limited. This diagnosis is consistent with the forecasts of interna-
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tional organisations which, while acknowledging a considerable heightening of uncertainty and 
downside risk, continue pointing to a scenario of ongoing world buoyancy. Realistically, how-
ever, if the United States went into recession, a signifi cant change in the world economic 
scenario could take place, although the impact would in any event be cushioned by the con-
tinued buoyancy of the emerging economies, which have generally been little affected by the 
fi nancial turbulence.
The extent of the impact on global growth will also depend fundamentally on the force and 
duration of the shocks generated. In the past, in episodes such as that of 1998 sparked by the 
collapse of the Long Term Capital Management fund and by the Russian debt crisis, the fi nan-
cial turbulence barely infl uenced world economic buoyancy despite the dark predictions that 
accompanied it. Other episodes, by contrast, such as the “new economy” crisis had a more 
far-reaching impact, albeit of varying intensity and duration in the different geographical are-
as.
Unfortunately, these experiences are no precedent for diagnosing the potential scope of 
the current episode, which exhibits many new features, including the fact that it is espe-
cially concentrated in the Western heartland of the industrialised countries. The recent 
past has seen turbulence in Asia, Latin America and eastern Europe. Now, in contrast, 
the shocks are mainly affecting the United States and the more developed European 
countries.
Let me thus take an eminently European perspective as I examine more closely some of the 
main features at play here. This approach will also help me to look at its implications for euro 
monetary policy, which I believe is the most logical way to address the possible impact on the 
Spanish economy.
I wish to begin by emphasising the non-existence in the euro area of the sub-prime mortgages 
that are accepted practice in the United States. Therefore, in the fi rst analysis, the rise in 
doubtful assets in the United States should affect only the European fi nancial intermediaries 
that acquired securities linked to sub-prime mortgage loans originated in that economy. How-
ever, the propagation of contagion is not confi ned to the infl uence of this channel alone, but 
rather is transmitted through a wider range of shocks.
The increase in doubtful assets and defaults in US mortgages has set in motion a global proc-
ess of upward revision of credit risk premiums, which in the climate of economic boom of re-
cent years had sunk to very low, barely discriminatory levels, prompting what was probably 
excessive investment in potentially high-risk activities.
These investments were further driven by the proliferation of new fi nancial intermediaries spe-
cialised in the credit risk transfer markets to which I referred earlier. In particular, in the current 
bout of turbulence a major role has been played by institutions that raise funds by issuing very 
short-term fi xed-income securities and use the proceeds to acquire structured products linked 
to long-term loans, including US sub-prime mortgages.
The liquidity risks associated with such practices have been clearly under-estimated by these 
specialised institutions. And the consequences have been felt in the money markets because 
some credit institutions agreed to provide liquidity to these specialised institutions if, upon 
maturity, the latter did not manage to roll over the funds raised via the issuance of securities. 
This led to a serious liquidity crisis in the money markets of a good number of industrialised 
economies, including the euro area.
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Central banks, and the ECB in particular, reacted rapidly and implemented emergency proc-
esses to inject the amounts of liquidity demanded by the market. This prevented the lack of 
liquidity from compounding the crisis and sent a message of calm and reassurance to the 
markets.
However, the diffi culties in pricing the structured products linked to sub-prime mortgages and, 
above all, the patent lack of transparency in the process of pooling, segmentation and redis-
tribution of credit risk carried out through these products are causing problems of confi dence 
between institutions.
All these problems have practically paralysed the interbank markets for term loans, in which 
transaction volumes are very low, and led to interest rates above those expected under normal 
circumstances. European stock market prices, particularly for fi nancial and construction fi rms, 
have also been adversely affected, while some investors have shifted to lower-risk assets such 
as government debt, resulting in declines in yields on these securities.
The uncertainties deriving from all these movements pose evident added complexity in mon-
etary policy decision-making.
Fortunately, the financial turbulence described reaches Europe at a time of high eco-
nomic buoyancy and, therefore, notable resilience in the euro area. The GDP of the euro 
area grew somewhat less than expected in the second quarter of the year, but 2007 to 
date represents, overall, a continuation of the economic boom initiated in the area in mid-
2005. The sound financial position of firms, the expected profit rates and the favourable 
response of employment to the step-up in activity suggest that this stage of output ex-
pansion will persist over the coming quarters at a rate that, although it may well be 
slightly lower than anticipated some months ago, continues to be around potential 
growth. It should be kept in mind that the persistence of certain global imbalances and 
protectionist pressures and the uncertainties over oil and other commodity prices repre-
sent risk factors for growth, which date from before the outbreak of the current bout of 
turbulence.
Turning to prices, the behaviour of production seems to have been accompanied by a slight 
upturn in infl ation to around 2% in the medium term, since the smaller contribution of indirect 
taxes (which has been especially marked in 2007) should be offset by the larger contribution 
of unit labour costs, in what is a buoyant labour market. Against this background, a possible 
increase in wage pressure associated with the aforementioned taking-up of slack in the labour 
market, or a widening of the margins in those sectors more sheltered from international com-
petition, pose risk factors for price stability in the euro area.
The current fi nancial market turbulence has naturally heightened the downside risk to growth, 
and this has in some way mitigated infl ationary risks, which nevertheless continue to rise. 
Above all, however, the turbulence has widened the range of uncertainty associated with the 
central scenario for the European economy that I have just described.
In these conditions, the fi rst ECB Governing Council meeting this month unanimously decided, 
as you know, to hold interest rates unchanged and gather more information on this episode of 
turbulence and study it in more detail before taking any new decisions. It should come as no 
surprise to anyone that the conditional nature of the decisions, which has always been a sig-
nifi cant feature of ECB monetary policy practice, should take on particular signifi cance in the 
current setting of particularly high global uncertainty.
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Hence in the coming months the main channels through which fi nancial shocks could affect 
the European economy will have to be monitored very closely. In my opinion, three factors 
require particular attention. First, it is necessary to gauge the true extent of the US slowdown, 
its possible spread to the world economy and the possible impact on exchange rates. Sec-
ond, at the European level, the effect of the turbulence on the cost and availability of fi nancing 
for the private sector will have to be calibrated. Finally, the possible impact on corporate and 
consumer confi dence will have to be monitored carefully. The signs identifi ed in these latter 
two channels, i.e. credit and economic sentiment, will be particularly informative for euro area 
economic growth when they affect countries in which consumption growth is still somewhat 
hesitant.
I also believe that, echoing the words of the ECB President after the Governing Council meet-
ing, this is an appropriate time to reiterate the fi rm commitment of monetary policy to the ob-
jective of price stability, which is the best way to promote the sustained growth of output and 
employment and thus the welfare of European citizens in general and of Spaniards in particu-
lar.
In fact, these events have taken place at a time when the Spanish economy, too, continues to 
show considerable buoyancy that is prolonging its already long expansionary phase. Output 
grew in the fi rst half of this year at a rate of around or slightly above 4% (in line with the per-
formance in the closing months of 2006) and the vigour of activity was compatible with a more 
even balance between domestic and foreign sources of spending. In particular, the contribu-
tion of net external demand, which trimmed two percentage points from growth in certain 
months of 2004 and 2005, improved in 2006 and continued to do so in the fi rst half of this 
year. At the same time, the share of business investment in domestic demand has continued 
to rise at the expense of private consumption and residential investment.
The process of normalisation of monetary and fi nancial conditions that commenced at the end 
of 2005 has contributed effectively to achieving this more balanced composition of spending. 
Moreover, the healthy performance of the world economy in 2006 and, in particular, the recov-
ery of the euro area have spurred exports after several years of weakness. On the supply side, 
the growing availability of labour resources in a highly expansionary demographic setting 
helped to smooth the adjustment of activity to this robust demand, preventing excessive cost 
and price pressure from building up. Indeed, the infl ation rate fell to around 2% (2.2% in July 
and August), taking the differential with the euro area to half a percentage point, although 
some rise can be expected in the rest of the year and in the fi rst quarter of next year.
The smoothly slowing path of household consumption in 2006 and the fi rst half of this year 
refl ects, as mentioned above, the foreseeable adaptation to more normal monetary and fi nan-
cial conditions. The rise in interest rates that began at the end of 2005 has been spreading 
gradually to the various fi nancial and banking markets, stimulating household saving and in-
creasing the interest burden on indebted households. Also, the lower rates of household 
wealth appreciation (mainly due to the gradual containment of house price rises) have reduced 
the expansionary infl uence of wealth effects on consumption. Counterbalancing this, the 
strength of employment, which continues to grow at more than 3%, and the high levels of 
confi dence have played a signifi cant role in ensuring that this process of adjustment of house-
hold consumption to more sustainable levels has been smooth.
Also perceptible since the beginning of 2006 has been the lesser vigour of residential invest-
ment which, as in the case of private consumption, was also in response to the interest rate 
rise and to the lowered expectations of house appreciation following the sharp price increases 
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of previous years. In this case, the gradualness of the residential investment slowdown was 
made possible by the support provided by strong housing demand, against a backdrop of 
high demographic momentum in the Spanish economy in recent years.
The lower contribution to growth of these two domestic expenditure components was offset, 
fi rst, by the continued buoyancy of productive investment of fi rms, in a situation of high profi t-
ability and favourable business expectations due to the continued momentum of domestic 
demand and, above all, to the surge in the world economy. In particular, capital goods invest-
ment in 2006 grew by more than 10% and in recent quarters its rate of expansion has been 
around 13%. Furthermore, net external demand has helped to mitigate the impact of the slow-
down in household spending on growth, thanks to the notable recovery of exports in 2006 and 
to the moderation in imports in the fi rst half of this year.
The most probable scenario for the coming months is the continued gradual moderation of 
domestic demand and of output growth. In fact, there were signs in 2007 Q2 that might sug-
gest a gradual change to a more subdued growth path, although GDP growth was only 10 bp 
less than in the fi rst quarter of the year. The information (still very partial and fragmentary) of 
certain economic indicators relating to 2007 Q3 also points in this direction.
In light of the buoyancy of domestic demand in recent years, it is reasonable that private con-
sumption and residential investment should show somewhat lower growth rates, although, as 
has been the case so far, a continued robust employment and population growth rate would 
fairly effectively counter the possible deceleration of these two variables. In the construction 
sector, moreover, investment in civil engineering and in non-residential building, which has so 
far shown greater resilience, will foreseeably remain vigorous in the next few years. This could 
soften the negative impact on growth caused by the slowing of residential investment, where 
a cyclical downturn seems to have started.
Productive investment will probably continue to be the most buoyant component of domestic 
demand, although it is hardly likely that it alone will offset the lower contribution of household 
spending. Therefore, the role of net external demand will be fundamental in ensuring that a 
certain containment of expenditure is compatible with continued growth of around 3%. The 
contribution of this variable will hinge crucially on the behaviour of Spain’s export markets, but 
also on competitiveness, which is a factor that fi rms and the economic authorities are actually 
able to infl uence.
In this respect, the basic channel through which the recent episode of fi nancial instability and 
heightened international uncertainty could affect the Spanish economy’s expected growth 
scenario depends on the performance of the foreign sector. Indeed, if that episode signifi -
cantly affected the buoyancy of Spain’s international markets, the capacity of external demand 
to contain the negative impact of the slowdown in private spending would be diminished.
The Spanish economy’s track record over the last few years shows that the behaviour of em-
ployment and its infl uence on household income expectations play a key role as drivers of 
household spending. For this reason, it is essential that resource allocation mechanisms 
should be suffi ciently fl exible to enable industrial and service activities (partly linked to exports) 
to play a greater role and take up the baton from construction.
From the standpoint of the continued dynamism of domestic spending, attention also has to 
be paid to how the Spanish economy may be affected by a possible tightening of fi nancial 
conditions stemming from developments in European fi nancial markets, a process in which a 
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fundamental role is played by the behaviour of Spanish fi nancial institutions. Allow me, there-
fore, to devote special attention at this point in my address to the current situation of Spanish 
credit institutions, which stand at the heart of our fi nancial system. 
Spanish credit institutions face this bout of turbulence from a position of strength based prin-
cipally on high profi tability, which is always the fi rst line of defence against any adverse shock; 
comfortable solvency levels clearly above the minimum regulatory requirements; and, standing 
at some point between the two, the ample coverage of doubtful assets by the provisions that 
have been built up during the boom years. I believe that the role played by the Banco de Es-
paña in promoting this accumulation of provisions is well known, so I shall not dwell on this 
point.
I will, however, point out that there are various idiosyncratic factors in the performance of 
Spanish institutions that have limited their exposure to the current shocks. I have already men-
tioned that in the euro area there is no equivalent to the US sub-prime mortgage market, an 
observation that applies fully to Spain. Rather, the credit quality of Spanish mortgages is high, 
as shown by the low doubtful assets ratio and the moderate levels of the average loan-to-vol-
ume ratio and of the collateral required.
Along these same lines, the weight of the assets linked to the sub-prime mortgages on institu-
tions’ balance sheets is completely marginal, as is also their indirect exposure through any 
lines of credit granted to other fi nancial intermediaries that may actually hold such assets. The 
fact is that intermediaries of this type have not proliferated in Spain’s fi nancial system.
One of the factors that has probably contributed most to preserving the quality of assets in the 
Spanish fi nancial system is the persistence of a traditional banking model in which, unlike in 
other countries (especially the United States) in recent years, institutions have used asset se-
curitisation mainly to fund the expansion of activity and not to transfer to third parties the risks 
associated with their loan portfolio. One particularly positive effect of this pattern of behaviour 
in the current situation is that the institutions’ practice of keeping credit risks on their own bal-
ance sheets has acted as a powerful incentive for them to ensure that their risk quality controls 
continue to work properly. Also, since the securitisation processes used by Spanish institu-
tions have aimed to raise fresh funds rather than redistribute risks, instruments such as cov-
ered bonds or asset-backed bonds have been used, which are not very complex and are 
much easier to price than the structured products that have proliferated in other parts of the 
world.
These sources of solidity should not lead us to overlook the danger that an excessive prolon-
gation of the current bout of turbulence could ultimately have undesirable effects on investor 
confi dence. These effects might extend above and beyond a desirable and healthy correction 
of abnormally low risk premiums and volatility levels, and substantially reduce the capacity of 
fi nancial markets to offer useful yardsticks by which investors can discriminate the true credit 
quality of the different instruments. If this were to happen, the need for the Spanish economy 
to turn to the international markets to fi nance a large part of the investment spending of Span-
ish households and fi rms could become an obstacle to continued high buoyancy in the fu-
ture.
Overall, ladies and gentlemen, since I last appeared before you, the growth prospects for the 
Spanish economy that I then described largely remain in place, although the fi nancial turmoil 
has, as everywhere, heightened the uncertainty surrounding those prospects. The outlook of-
fered by a scenario of continued buoyancy - albeit at a slightly more moderate rate but with a 
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more balanced composition - and the solidity of our fi nancial institutions are evidence of a 
strength that affords every assurance of being able to withstand the impact of the turbulence. 
However, depending on the ultimate duration and intensity of this episode of turbulence, it 
cannot be ruled out that some diffi culties may arise to prevent external demand from acting, 
as it has to date, as a factor suffi cient to offset the foreseeable gradual moderation of domes-
tic demand. This will be even more the case if the impact of the fi nancial instability on the 
growth of Spain’s main export markets becomes substantial.
In circumstances such as those prevailing at present, economic policy has a very important 
role to play in offering a framework in which confi dence stems from the existence of leeway for 
taking action to deal with possible future contingencies. To this end, policy should maintain its 
fi rm stance on medium-term stability targets and consequently avoid the adoption of meas-
ures excessively focused on the short term. In this respect, budgetary policy should not change 
its current stance, which is proving so benefi cial for the strength of the economy by preserving 
a suffi ciently wide budget surplus, so that there is headroom to deploy, if needed, its stabilising 
potential in less favourable circumstances than those prevailing at present. For this purpose, 
spending deviations should be avoided, since they would absorb prematurely a part of that 
headroom at a possibly inappropriate time. We will have occasion to look more specifi cally at 
this topic in the framework of the budget discussion process.
An equally important task is that of continuing to implement resolutely and ambitiously the 
structural reform agenda, both in making the goods and factor markets more fl exible and in 
pushing ahead with the capitalisation, productivity and competitiveness of the economy. These 
reforms are essential in the current circumstances because they are needed to enable re-
sources, such as labour, to be reallocated without friction between sectors and to improve the 
conditions under which Spanish production competes in the international markets.
Thank you.
18.9.2007.
